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ABSTRACT
Lightning Network (LN) is a widely-used network of payment
channels enabling faster and cheaper Bitcoin transactions. In this
paper, we outline three ways an attacker can steal funds from
honest LN users. The attacks require dilating the time for victims to
become aware of new blocks by eclipsing (isolating) victims from
the network and delaying block delivery. While our focus is on
the LN, time-dilation attacks may be relevant to any second-layer
protocol that relies on a timely reaction.
According to our measurements, it is currently possible to steal
the total channel capacity by keeping a node eclipsed for as little as 2
hours. Since trust-minimized Bitcoin light clients currently connect
to a very limited number of random nodes, running just 500 Sybil
nodes allows an attacker to Eclipse 47% of newly deployed light
clients (and hence prime them for an attack). As for the victims
running a full node, since they are often used by large hubs or
service providers, an attacker may justify the higher Eclipse attack
cost by stealing all their available liquidity.
In addition, time-dilation attacks neither require access to hashrate
nor purchasing from a victim. Thus, this class of attacks is a more
practical way of stealing funds via Eclipse attacks than previously
anticipated double-spending.
We argue that simple detection techniques based on the slow
block arrival alone are not effective, and implementing more so-
phisticated detection is not trivial. We suggest that a combination
of anti-Eclipse/anti-Sybil measures are crucial for mitigating time-
dilation attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic cash system, which solves the
double-spend problem with a trust-minimized architecture by let-
ting everyone verify all transactions [38]. As of Nov. 2019, the
system operates over at least 60,000 nodes1 simultaneously run-
ning Bitcoin protocol software, not including the many more users
of custodial services and trusted solutions.
Public auditability of the Bitcoin transaction history is the foun-
dation of removing trusted third parties. The drawback of public
auditability is a constraint on the transaction throughput. Second-
layer protocols on top of Bitcoin were designed to overcome this
limitation [4, 29, 43]. For example, in Lightning Network (LN) [43],
solving the double-spend problem by shifting it to be a private
matter (as opposed to being solved on-chain).
Second-layer protocols introduce new assumptions when com-
pared to the original Bitcoin threat model. In this work, we explore
how LN users may be subjected to a risk of having their funds
stolen, once their Bitcoin nodes are eclipsed from honest nodes.
At high level, we exploit the requirements to monitor the Bitcoin
blockchain and to detect relevant transactions in a timely manner.
1From https://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/software.html
Per time-dilation attacks, a malicious actor slows down block deliv-
ery to the victim and then finalizes an expired state of the Lightning
channel on-chain, before a victim can notice.
For a non-infrastructure attacker eclipsing full nodes is difficult,
but definitely not impossible, as demonstrated by prior work [19,
30, 37]. Since full nodes in the LN are often used by hubs (or big
service providers), we will show that an attacker may justify the
high attack cost by stealing their aggregate liquidity during one
short (several hours) Eclipse attack.
At the same time, we will demonstrate that Eclipse attacks are
easier to carry out against the many LN users whose wallets rely on
light client protocols to obtain information from the Bitcoin network,
and light client implementations are currently more vulnerable to
Eclipse attacks then full nodes.
If an attacker has a payment channel to a victim, and a victim
is eclipsed, the remaining attack is only a matter of time (hours to
days), and the attack success rate is approximately 93%. This makes
our attacks as difficult as Eclipse attacks in practice. When combined
with the fact that time-dilation attacks require neither hashrate
access nor purchasing from a victim, time-dilation becomes the
most practical way of stealing funds via Eclipse attacks, compared
to the well-known double-spending of eclipsed nodes.
The problem can’t be addressed by simply detecting the slow
block arrival due to the uneven intervals between mined blocks.
More advanced detection-based measures should be deployed care-
fully, considering a number of trade-offs: the effect of false positives
and a chosen recovery strategy on payment channels and Bitcoin
in general. Mitigations to the time-dilation attacks should be built
around strong anti-Eclipse measures.
The paper is structured as follows:
• We provide the background required to understand Bitcoin
and the Lightning Network: their advantages, limitations
and assumptions in Section 2.
• We discuss the preparation required for time-dilation attacks
including eclipsing a victim’s Bitcoin node and mapping a
Bitcoin node to a Lightning node in Section 3.
• We define our threat model, how to launch time-dilation,
why it is so difficult to mitigate it by simply observing slow
block arrival, and three ways of exploiting time-dilation in
Section 4.
• We discuss the optimal strategy for an attacker to exploit
time-dilation considering the already implemented stale tip
detection in Bitcoin Core, and measure the attack cost and
the gain from the attacks in Section 5.
• We suggest various measures to raise the bar for setting
up time-dilation attacks on LN and discuss the trade-offs of
sophisticated detection-based measures in Section 6.
• We suggest a list of open questions for further discussion
and research in Section 7.
• We discuss how our work complements the prior research
on the security of Bitcoin and Lightning in Section 8.
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2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Bitcoin Base Layer
The primary goals of the Bitcoin system are relaying and validating
financial transactions. Bitcoin solves the double-spending problem
by organizing transactions into a sequence of blocks.
A transaction in Bitcoin is unconfirmed until it is included in a
valid block. Then, the number of blocks created on top of that block
represents the degree of confirmations the transaction has. This
confirmation indication works largely due to the Bitcoin built-in
incentive system: mining a block is a difficult and expensive task,
which may result in a reward.
The more confirmations a transaction has, the more confident
the receiver is that the transaction is unlikely to be reverted. We
use unlikely because absolute transaction finality in Bitcoin does
not exist by design.
However, the incentives are aligned in a way that reverting
a larger number of blocks becomes more and more unprofitable
under a fundamental Bitcoin assumption. This assumption is that
a fraction of malicious mining power does not exceed 50% in the
long run (usually roughly defined as several hours to days).
Mining a Bitcoin blockmainly consists of two phases: assembling
a valid sequence of transactions and finding a random nonce, which
would satisfy the Proof-of-Work [5, 18] algorithm requirements.
The Proof-of-Work difficulty adjustment rule makes sure the
expected time of producing a block is 10 minutes on average. These
10-minute average intervals, as well as an upper bound of the block
size, are used for a number of reasons, related to security and
scalability.
These rules have two negative consequences. First, theymake Bit-
coin transactions potentially expensive: competition for the block
space creates a transaction fee market, which may drive fees up.
Second, they make transactions slow: as explained above, in most
cases confirming a transaction requires waiting for at least one
block. Both of these problems become more apparent when more
transactions are happening on the Bitcoin blockchain.
2.2 Off-Chain Scaling
To address these issues, off-chain scaling constructions were pro-
posed [24]. These constructions are usually based on the techniques
enabled by the Bitcoin scripting language, Script. They are often re-
ferred to as Layer 2 because they operate on top of Bitcoin on-chain
transactions (referred to as Layer 1).
The security of off-chain protocols differs from the security of
the Bitcoin protocol because at least one of the following holds:
• these protocols introduce an extra assumption on trusting
third parties (e.g., a federation of operators [4])
• users are assumed to react in a timely manner to base layer
updates [43]
In Section 2.4, we further discuss the second assumption (relevant
for the LN), and later use it as a basis for the attacks we demonstrate.
Since Lightning Network heavily uses advanced transaction
types, we will now explain the internals of Bitcoin transactions.
2.3 Transactions in Bitcoin
Transactions in Bitcoin consist of inputs, unlocking scripts, and out-
puts. Inputs indicate which funds are being spent by a transaction.
Unlocking scripts provide data required to verify that a spender
indeed is authorized to access inputs. Outputs define how the funds
can be spent further, effectively defining who owns the funds and
under which conditions.
In a simple scenario, a payee sends their public key to the payer,
and the payer uses that as a transaction output. When a transaction
is included in the blockchain, a payee can be sure they have access
to those funds.
Every transactionmay havemultiple inputs andmultiple outputs,
and they donâĂŹt have to directly map one to each other.
Outputs can be spent via a simple digital signature or more
complex conditions. For example, revealing a preimage for a pre-
defined hash. These are called Hash Time Locked Contracts
(HTLCs). As the name suggests, a HTLC is built up from two
primitives: a timelock and a hashlock. The contract semantics of an
HTLC can be understood as âĂĲif a preimage P is provided such
hash(P) == H_lock , before timelock expiration T , allow spending".
These primitives are provided by the Bitcoin scripting language.
We will now discuss payment channel constructions and LN,
based on these advanced spending conditions.
2.4 Lightning Network
The high-level idea of payment channels was first suggested [25]
by the creator(s) of Bitcoin in 2011: cache transactions between the
peers (payer and payee) instead of committing every transaction to
the Bitcoin blockchain. Even though the described design was not
secure, the high-level idea has since evolved and payment channels
are now used for off-chain scaling.
Themost widely used system based on Bitcoin payment channels
is the Lightning Network [43]: independent payment channels form
a network, where users transact bidirectionally with other members
of the network (via multi-hop payments).
Payment channels for the LN can be created after an out-of-band
negotiation where two users decide that it makes sense for them
to use channels instead of submitting every transaction on-chain.
However, the software is often enabled to open channels without
any negotiation.
Since the LN enables multi-hop payments, another common way
to join the network is to use an on-demand service for the channel
creation: create a channel to a hub, which would allow transacting
with other users reachable (potentially, indirectly) via that hub.
LN uses a modified Poon-Dryja revocation mechanism [43] to
enable bidirectional channels with unlimited lifetime. At a
high-level, proceeding with the new state reveals the revocation
secret, which makes the previous state invalid.
Poon-Dryja payment channels are opened when a funding trans-
action, a 2-of-2 multi-signature contract between Alice and Bob, is
submitted on-chain. This design enables a channel close with any
outcome if both of the parties are online and cooperating.
To ensure the security of the funds even if the counterparty
is irresponsive, transactions spending the multisig funding out-
put ("commitment") must always be valid and ready to broadcast.
Therefore at every state update, encoded by a new commitment
transaction, signatures must be exchanged. If Alice initiates the
update, she sends signatures for Bob’s new transactions. Bob then
revokes his previous set of transactions and sends his signatures to
Alice for her new transactions.
This transaction asymmetry and the structure of non-commitment
transactions (which we show in detail below) allow every party to
unilaterally close a channel without further interactivity. At the
same time, they enable punishment by the counterparty, if channel
closing is dishonest.
Committing to an outdated state on-chain by a malicious actor
is disincentivized by a punishment time-window. During this time,
an honest user can confiscate all funds of a malicious counterparty
through a justice transaction. The time-window is enforced directly
via relative timelocks [9].
Every state in LN is enforced by 6 types of transactions [14],
as seen from Alice’s viewpoint. Alice has 3 transactions, fully-
countersigned by Bob and ready to broadcast:
• Commitment transaction, used by Alice to finalize the state.
It has 4 types of outputs: Alice’s balance, Bob’s balance, of-
fered HTLC, received HTLC. An offered HTLC allows lock-
ing a conditional payment flowing from Alice to Bob. A
received HTLC allows a conditional payment flowing in the
reverse, from Bob to Alice. The distinction enables bidirec-
tional payment.
• HTLC-Timeout, used by Alice to spend an offered output on
her commitment transaction. It allows her to refund after
timelock expiration.
• HTLC-Success, used by Alice to spend a received output on
her commitment transaction. It allows her to get paid by
presenting a preimage before timelock expiration.
For every offered or received HTLC output, Alice must have a
corresponding HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction.
Bob may generate 3 single-signed (no need to update Alice’s
signatures) transactions in reaction to Alice behavior:
• Preimage transaction, used by Bob to spend an offered output
on Alice’s commitment transaction. Allows him to get paid
by presenting a preimage before timelock expiration.
• Timeout transaction, used by Bob to spend a received output
on Alice’s commitment transaction to refund himself after
timelock expiration.
• Justice transaction, used by Bob to spend any output belong-
ing to Alice’s revoked transaction. Allows him to confiscate
Alice’s funds by using previously revealed per-update revo-
cation secret.
Since the channel is symmetrical, Bob holds his own commit-
ment, HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success, on which Alice can generate
her reaction transactions.
Multi-hop payments are enabled in LN by routing HTLCs
across a path of nodes.
While the payment is routed through the LN, the whole payment
path shares a hashlock. A timelock is decreased at every hop from a
payer to a payee. Every multi-hop payment consists of three phases
(see Fig. 1):
(1) A payee sends to the payer an invoice containing a hash to
a preimage chosen by the payee.
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Figure 1: Routing payments in Lightning Network.
(2) Route setup, when every party agrees with the next hop to
add an HTLC on their local channel sequentially in every
channel, ordered from the payer to the payee.
(3) Settlement phase, where every party agrees with the previ-
ous hop to remove the HTLC, once the preimage is known
to the channel participant from the payee side. The preimage
is propagated all the way to the first channel in the chain.
This sequence of decreasing timelocks enables a secure in-order
HTLC settlement. An intermediate hop is always able to claim an
incoming HTLC with a timelock less or equal to the outgoing one,
or to cancel it after a state update. In other words, it makes an
intermediate router protected from the loss of an HTLC.
The per-hop delay (timelock difference) used for this protection
is called cltv_delta. It is enforced by each intermediate hop during
the route setup phase, at the reception of an incoming HTLC.
2.5 Extra Assumptions
The cost of scaling solutions based on payment channels is new
assumptions, of which the following is relevant for our work: a
user should always have access to the recent blockchain history and
should be able to broadcast transactions, in the case of counterparty
misbehavior.
Fundamentally speaking, LN introduces new security parameters.
Instead of measuring the finality of the transactions with confir-
mations only (number of blocks after inclusion in the blockchain),
the security of payments in the LN should also be measured by
the chosen timelocks. The longer funds are locked in a channel,
the better chance an honest user has to act on the misbehavior
of a counterparty and get their funds back from the channel. At
the same time, it makes the protocol less flexible for an honest
unilateral close, triggered by an irresponsive counterparty.
The required blockchain monitoring can be done via running a
full Bitcoin node, by relying on a trusted third party or by using
a light client. We do not cover issues with trusting third parties in
our work, because we focus on the non-custodial use.
In theory, partial third party trust can significantly increase the
security, and, to the best of our knowledge, this method is used by
several popular Lightning wallets. But again, it changes the threat
model by introducing trust.
For example, if a Lightning wallet is based on secure open-source
software but doesn’t have strong Eclipse protection, the trusted
node still can choose to steal funds via time-dilation. While it might
not make sense against a single client, an exit scam from a wallet
developer (usually operating the trusted node) stealing funds from
all the channels is plausible, even if the software is secure other-
wise. Thus, by focusing on a trust-minimized scenario we cover the
security of these clients as well.
2.6 Light Client Protocols
Several protocols have been proposed to reduce the requirement
of running a full node and still use Bitcoin with a fairly trust-
minimized model. All of them use client-server architecture with
multiple servers, assuming that at least one of the servers a client
connects to is honest.
Light clients are often used as a Bitcoin blockchain processing
backend on resource-constrained devices (like mobile phones). Un-
derstanding the security of these clients is important to evaluate
the security of LN client implementations.
The first popular non-standardized implementation of a light
client is Electrum. Per this protocol, Electrum light clients connect
to Electrum servers. Electrum server must have access to the chain
processing backend, usually co-located on the same machine with
the server.
Electrum itself provides configurations with different trade-offs.
For example, an Electrum user can connect their light clients to
Electrum Personal Server software run by themselves, or connect
to multiple reachable ElectrumX Servers run by someone else.
Electrum is currently used as a Bitcoin chain processing backend
by one of the most popular Lightning wallets, Eclair.
BIP 157 is the most popular standardized light client protocol.
Clients based on this protocol would connect to full nodes in the
Bitcoin network, receive a compact representation of Bitcoin blocks
(filters, as defined in another related standard, BIP 158), and, if a
filter detects relevant transactions on the client-side, request a full
block of transactions.
Neutrino is currently one of the most popular light client imple-
mentations, and it is based on BIP 157. Neutrino is used by at least
Breez and Wallet by Lightning Labs).
We will now provide the background on the relevant attacks
on the Bitcoin network and light clients, required to understand
time-dilation attacks on the Lightning Network. We will cover the
robustness of full Bitcoin nodes, Neutrino clients and Electrum
clients, because these are the most widely used Bitcoin backends
in the Lightning Network. We will not cover the security of other
light client protocols (e.g., BIP 37) because their implementations
are much less used and maintained.
3 ATTACK PREPARATION. ECLIPSE AND
NODE MAPPING
All Bitcoin nodes constitute a peer-to-peer network. Full Bitcoin
nodes can be roughly split into two categories:
• reachable from most of the Internet and accepting inbound
connections from other nodes
• non-reachable nodes behind NATs and firewalls
Reachable nodes act as a backbone, allowing other nodes to join
and relay transactions, blocks, and other necessary information.
As of March 2020, every Bitcoin Core node by default maintains
up to 8 outbound connections to relay transactions, blocks, and
network addresses of other nodes; and 2 extra connections to relay
exclusively blocks. All connections in the Bitcoin network are bidi-
rectional. Connections relaying only blocks leak less information
and are supposed to secure block relay.
Although outbound peer rotation has been discussed multiple
times [39, 44], Bitcoin Core never deviated from the status quo
approach. Thus, the topology is currently fairly static, and new
outbound connections for an existing node are only made due to
issues with existing connections.
Since the network is permissionless, it is naturally susceptible
to certain attacks, which enable time-dilation. We consider two
practical scenarios for time-dilation:
C1. VictimâĂŹs Bitcoin node is first eclipsed (isolated) as a part
of a broader attack on the Bitcoin network, and an attacker attempts
to find a corresponding Lightning node.
C2. Specific victimâĂŹs Lightning node (identified by IP and the
channels) is targeted, and then an attacker attempts to locate and
eclipse a corresponding Bitcoin node.
In both cases, an attacker would have to eclipse a victim’s Bitcoin
node and map a Lightning node to a Bitcoin node (often involving
transaction origin inference), in different orders.
These attacks are relevant against LN users running their own
full nodes or light clients for Bitcoin blockchain processing, instead
of relying on third parties. Wewill now describe the relevant attacks
targeting full nodes, and then discuss applying them to light clients
in more detail.
3.1 Eclipse Attacks on Full Nodes
By definition, an Eclipse attack implies preventing a victim’s node
from communicating with other honest participants of the network.
It is usually done by occupying all of the victimâĂŹs node con-
nections by malicious nodes or pseudo-nodes. An attacker gains
complete control over what and when a victim sends and receives
from the network. This is a crucial requirement for performing
time-dilation attacks. Fig. 2 demonstrates an Eclipse attack from
the topology perspective.
The first Eclipse attack on the Bitcoin network was demonstrated
by Heilman et. al. [19]. It is purely based on the high-level protocols
of the Bitcoin network, namely, address management and relay
logic. Further research demonstrated that using a combination
of the exploitation of the BGP protocol and BitcoinâĂŹs address
management can significantly reduce the eclipsing cost. Aposto-
laki et. al. [30] demonstrated that any network-level attacker (e.g.,
Autonomous System) can isolate a significant portion of nodes by
hijacking less than 100 prefixes, although the attack can be detected.
Tran et. al. [37] further shown that any Tier-2 Autonomous System
can Eclipse most of the reachable Bitcoin nodes in an undetectable
way.
The studied consequences of eclipsing a Bitcoin node include
monetary (double-spending attacks, attacks on mining) and non-
monetary (peer-to-peer layer deanonymization). Although Heilman
et. al. briefly mentioned monetary consequences on second layer
protocols [32], our work is the first to discuss these attacks in detail.
AB
C
Non-reachable
nodes
Reachable
nodes
Figure 2: Eclipse attack on the Bitcoin network. Only node
A is eclipsed, because all its connections lead to the attacker.
3.2 Eclipse Attacks on Neutrino
It is crucial for BIP 157 light clients to be connected to Bitcoin full
nodes providing the required server-side support.
The number of available honest serving nodes defines the secu-
rity of light clients against Sybil attacks. The more honest nodes
serve light clients, the more Sybil nodes an attacker needs to deploy
to Eclipse a victim. The security of light clients can in theory be
increased by connecting to regular full nodes and checking the tip
with them, but this behavior is currently not implemented.
Thus, for a given number of attacker Sybil serving nodes (Na ),
and a number of honest serving nodes (Nh ), and the number of out-
going connections every honest node maintains (C), the probability
of a successful Eclipse attack can be then measured as:
PE = ( Na
Nh + Na
)C (1)
To estimate the cost of eclipsing honest nodes via a trivial Sybil
attack today, we collected a list of available serving nodes from
the Bitcoin DNS seed servers. This is the same procedure any new
node in the network follows to learn about nodes in the network
during the initial bootstrap. After getting a subset of this list, light
clients usually choose 8 peers at random.
Currently, only one of the Bitcoin implementations (btcd) has
released a build with the server-side support for these light clients.
There are only around 30 reachable nodes in the network that run
this implementation. We also found 20 nodes running a custom
version on Bitcoin Core, based on the work-on-progress implemen-
tation of server-side BIP 157 support.
According to the formula above, spawning just 500 Sybil nodes
with server-side BIP 157 support would trivially eclipse a random
47% of newly deployed or restarted light clients.
To increase the probability of success for the attack, an attacker
would have to either create more Sybil server nodes or reduce
available honest server nodes. The former requirement makes it
expensive to Sybil attack the whole Bitcoin network, but quite
practical to attack the subset of nodes using BIP 157/158, because
this feature is supported by so few honest nodes. The latter can be
achieved via DoS.
Additionally, an attacker might exploit that neither Neutrino
nor btcd implement countermeasures discussed in [19, 37], and
those used in Bitcoin Core. For example, they donâĂŹt employ the
following methods:
• peer selection diversification based on an Autonomous Sys-
tem a peer belongs too, to make it more difficult for an at-
tacker to get victims exclusively connect to the attackerâĂŹs
Sybil nodes
• eviction on inbound connections when all the slots are oc-
cupied, to allow new nodes to connect to honest reachable
nodes even when their inbound capacity is exhausted.
Lack of these and other countermeasures in light clients allow
more sophisticated Eclipse attacks to succeed even at a lower cost.
3.3 Verifying Eclipse
Once an attacker suspects that a victim Bitcoin node is eclipsed,
they should verify that a node does not have another form of access
to the Bitcoin network.
The easiest way to verify a node is eclipsed is transaction prob-
ing based on transaction relay protocols. An attacker chooses a
random transaction they received from the network, and don’t re-
lay it to the eclipsed node through any of the connections under
control. Then, if a victimâĂŹs node announces that transaction to
an attacker, it means there is still a link between a victim and an
honest part of the network.
It would be more difficult if a node is connected to an external
source of blocks, which does not relay transactions. The proposed
methodology would identify eclipsing only the transaction relay as-
pect of the peer-to-peer communication, while these attacks require
eclipsing all links relaying blocks.
In this case, an attacker would have to apply block probing:
delaying a block delivery through all links to the victim, and ob-
serving whether a victim relays that block to the attacker nodes.
The only problem with this approach is that blocks arrive much
less often than transactions. Thus, if the probing demonstrated that
the victim is still not eclipsed, the next attempt will be possible no
earlier than in 10 minutes on average (as opposed to every second
with transactions).
Sometimes a victim may have an irregular source of blocks or
transactions (e.g., Blockstream Satellite service). In this case, a
combination of block and transaction probing would help an
attacker to timely identify that this is the case, deduce what kind
of external service a victim is using and whether they are capable
of disrupting this service. This would ultimately help the attacker
to choose a better strategy for proceeding with the attack.
3.4 Mapping Nodes
To launch a time-dilation attack, a malicious actor also has to map
a victim’s Bitcoin node to a Lightning node.
The easiest mapping technique is correlating Bitcoin and Light-
ning nodes that operate under the same IP. To measure how
many users run their nodes under the same IP, we scraped IP ad-
dresses of the Bitcoin nodes over a week. Then we correlated them
with the list of lightning nodes with advertised channels.
We were able to gather a list of 4,500 Lightning nodes and 52,000
Bitcoin nodes and found 982 matches by IP. Almost half of the
Lightning nodes were represented by an onion address, making
them even less likely to be traceable by this methodology. Only
two pairs of nodes shared the onion address. These numbers do not
include Lightning nodes with private (not advertised) channels and
non-listening Bitcoin nodes.
If Bitcoin and Lightning nodes operate under different IPs,
an attacker would have to apply the following heuristics.
In caseC1, an attacker would have to find which Lightning chan-
nel funding transactions originated from the victimâĂŹs eclipsed
Bitcoin node, and map those transactions to channel announce-
ments in the Lightning network. The most straightforward ap-
proach is to apply transaction origin inference against Lightning-
related transactions coming from the victimâĂŹs Bitcoin node. It
can provide precise results because an attacker can analyze all the
relevant messages coming from/to the victim node, acting as a
Man-in-the-Middle between a victim and the honest part of the
network.
Alternatively, an attacker can withhold a block from the vic-
timâĂŹs eclipsed Bitcoin node, and look for the nodes in the Light-
ning Network which donâĂŹt accept and relay some of the channel
announcements, which become valid within the withheld block.
For case C2, an attacker would have to:
(1) Deploy Sybil nodes in the Bitcoin network, both connecting
to honest nodes and accepting connections from them
(2) Apply transaction origin inference to the relay of the Bitcoin
transactions corresponding to the victimâĂŹs channels
In both cases, the approach involving transaction origin infer-
ence might take days or even weeks.
For C1, the upper bound on time is set by the channel’s lifetime,
which can be unlimited in the LN. If a victim never commits any
channels on-chain, it is impossible to map their nodes. In practice,
channels do get closed, although the lifetime may vary from hours
to weeks, and an average channel age is currently 319 days 2.
Alternatively, an attacker can proactively open low-value chan-
nels with a victim and infer from them, if the victim’s LN implemen-
tation is configured accordingly (often enabled by default). This
technique would require an attacker to spend the minimum cost of
opening a channel per probe.
For C2, the upper bound is set by the time it takes to passively
accept enough incoming connections from honest nodes. It may
take days because honest nodes rarely add new peers (only when an
existing peer is disconnected), and forcing reconnections requires
attack capabilities beyond our threat model. Proactive connection
to victims is not enough, because in Bitcoin Core transactions are
relayed to inbound connections slower to make Sybil-based spying
less effective.
We will now discuss the known techniques and the feasibility of
the transaction origin inference required for mapping nodes.
3.5 Transaction Origin Inference on Full Nodes
Transaction origin inference means finding a Bitcoin node, from
which a particular transaction was initially relayed. This would
allow linking a transaction to a particular IP address, assuming a
2As shown by https://1ml.com/statistics on 2020-05-15
transaction sender uses their own node to submit transactions. We
anticipate that this is a fair assumption for LN users who prefer a
trust-minimized model compared to relying on a third-party.
It is possible that a transaction was relayed via a proxy node or
Tor, in which case it would trigger a false positive observation, but
this is currently not the default behavior and not the general case 3.
Transaction origin inference was previously explored in [1, 13,
23, 34, 40]. Most of the demonstrated attacks are a form of a Sybil
attack and use the first-spy estimator. The first-spy estimator tech-
nique relies on the assumption that the node which announces a
transaction earlier than other nodes, is likely to be an originating
node to the transaction or is directly connected to the originating
node [48].
Related work demonstrated that it is currently possible to in-
fer transaction origin at high accuracy [22, 48] with a moderate
network of Sybils.
3.6 Transaction Origin Inference on Neutrino
Aswe explained before, network-level transaction deanonymization
in the suggested threat model usually relies on first-spy estimation:
establishing multiple connections to honest nodes in the network
and analyzing the messages coming from those nodes.
Bitcoin Core employs several techniques to obfuscate transaction
flow across the network. These include:
(1) random âĂĲdiffusionâĂİ delays before announcing a trans-
action
(2) increased diffusion delay for inbound connections
(3) shared diffusion delay timer for all inbound connections
(4) diverse node connectivity based on the IP ranges or Au-
tonomous Systems
None of these would work for Neutrino, because those light
clients broadcast only their own transactions. Thus, it is enough for
an attacker to make sure it has at least one direct connection
from the Neutrino node of a victim, to infer the origin. In this case
an attacker has to be sure that the victim runs a light client (and not
a full node), which is currently trivial to infer from the peer-to-peer
behavior of the victim.
Neutrino clients currently connect to a very limited number
of public nodes (see Section 3.2). Every Neutrino client chooses 8
nodes at random from the available pool of 50 honest nodes serving
filters per BIP 158. An attacker with only 100 Sybil nodes can be
sure that a victim is directly connected to a Sybil node at least
once with a 97% chance. This would allow the attacker to identify a
source of a given transaction with very high accuracy and low cost.
3.7 Attacks on Electrum Light Clients
Robustness to Eclipse attacks and transaction origin inference of
Electrum light clients depends on the chosen mode of operation.
If an Electrum user runs their own Electrum Personal Server
or ElectrumX Server connected to their own Bitcoin full node, the
user inherits the security from Bitcoin Core, partially described
previously in this section.
If an Electrum user connects to ElectrumX Servers run by some-
one else, they face the same issues as Neutrino. A very low number
3Only 5 of 17 popular wallets listed at bitcoin.org have the Tor feature as of 2020-01-10
of deployed servers4 and lack of strong anti-Sybil measures (com-
pared to Bitcoin Core) make it easy to eclipse honest users.
4 TIME-DILATION AND THE ATTACKS
In this Section we demonstrate the conservative threat model we
chose, discuss the nature of time-dilation, and suggest three practi-
cal ways to steal money from LN channels.
4.1 Threat Model
First of all, we assume that an attacker can open a payment channel
to a victim. Although it can be done both before and after eclipsing
the victim, in our work we assume the former for simplification.
The process of opening a channel is discussed in Section 2.4.
We also make the following assumptions:
• Users run unmodified Bitcoin and Lightning node software.
• The blockchain provides transaction safety based on con-
firmations: mining hashrate is stable and blocks are mined
reliably.
• The network of honest users forms a connected graph, except
for a victim eclipsed by an attacker.
For simplicity we also assume that blocks are reliably relayed
across nodes within seconds. We refer to the latest known block as
"blockchain tip".
When it comes to the capabilities of an attacker, we consider:
• An attacker does not control any hash-rate.
• An attacker can deploy hundreds of Sybil nodes with modi-
fied Bitcoin node software.
• An attacker does not exceed the network-level capabilities
discussed in the prior art on Eclipse attacks [19, 30, 37].
This threat model allows an attacker to execute the underlying
attacks (eclipsing, node mapping). An attacker then becomes capa-
ble of time-dilating a victim and stealing funds from their payment
channels.
4.2 Time-dilation
After a node is eclipsed (and there is a payment channel to a vic-
tim), an attacker has to perform time-dilation: slowing down block
delivery to the victimâĂŹs Bitcoin node. Time-dilation is possible
(can’t be trivially detected) because, as we discussed in Section 2,
block mining is a Poisson process. For example, even though it is
expected to see blocks every 10 minutes on average, seven blocks a
day generally take longer than 30 minutes to be produced.
To time-dilate a victim, an attacker has to simply introduce a
delay between receiving a block and feeding it to the victim. Since
the victim is eclipsed and doesn’t have an honest source of blocks,
the attacker can decide when the victim receives a new block.
As of today, no dedicated countermeasure letting a victim dis-
tinguish between deferred block propagation from a random event
is implemented in any of the Bitcoin client software. Furthermore,
countermeasures based on the delivery time alone can’t be
effective against time-dilation: they either have high false posi-
tive rate or high false negative rate.
In other words, if these detections are triggered too often, and a
node is configured to force close channels on this trigger, channels
461 server, as listed at https://1209k.com/bitcoin-eye/ele.php as of 2020-04-13
Implementation CSV delta CLTV delta Timeout Policy
C-lightning 144 14 7
LND 144-2016 40 10
Eclair 720 144 11
Rust-lightning 144 72 6
Table 1: Default timelocks (in blocks).
become less attractive economically, because they become very
short-lived. There are also privacy issues: if emergency block fetch-
ing is triggered too easily (even by naturally slow blocks), it leaks
the fetcher’s privacy, which may enable more severe attacks.
If they are triggered not often enough, they allow an attacker to
adapt to them (for example, by time-dilating at a pace which doesn’t
trigger them), so that the attack still can be launched undetectably,
although it may take a little longer.
Thus, a good detection-based countermeasure implemented in
the Bitcoin client should have a low true negative rate, but at the
same time trigger a less radical (e.g., warning to a node operator)
action. But even then, a victim would attempt to connect to the
honest network again, which boils down to anti-Eclipse and anti-
Sybil measures which could have been taken in the first place even
without this trigger.
In Section 5, we demonstrate how stale tip detection in Bitcoin
Core bounds an attacker in terms of the maximum time-dilation per
block, and suggest an optimal attack strategy which makes stale
tip detection ineffective against time-dilation.
Once the victimâĂŹs Bitcoin node is confirmed to be eclipsed
and an attacker is able to slow down block delivery to that node,
time-dilation attacks can be launched.
In the following descriptions, pseudonyms âĂĲAliceâĂİ and
âĂĲBobâĂİ represent users of the Lightning Network, "Mallory"
and "Mallet" represent an attacker’s entities.
We start by examining the scenario targeting the channel state
finalization delay, the hardest to exploit in practice but the most
studied so far. Then we explore more creative attacks targetting
per-hop packet delay and packet finalization delays, the latter being
much more practical than the other two.
4.3 A1. Targeting Channel State Finalization
This attack is structured similarly to the regular on-chain Bitcoin
double-spend.
Let’s say Alice andMallory have a payment channel. The channel
is configured with a CheckSequenceVerify5 [9] timelock ofC blocks
for contestation (see channel design in Section 2.4). The default
choice of C in major LN implementations is summarized in 1.
To start exploiting an attack, Mallory should make Alice be C
blocks behind the actual tip of the blockchain by performing time-
dilation. As a result, Alice’s block height is pinned at H −C , where
H is the height of the actual latest block in the network.
Once the difference in heights is achieved, Mallory can double-
spend Alice. To do so, Mallory negotiates with Alice a new state.
Per this new state, Mallory pays Alice and receives something (in
an irreversible way, like a physical or digital good) from Alice.
5A delay (in blocks) timelocking the spending transaction based on the confirmation
height of the spent transaction
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Figure 3: Attack A2. Mallory andMallet are attackers, Bob is
a time-dilated victim. Steps 4-5 happen simultaneously.
Then Mallory commits the previous state on-chain with a preferred
outdated state. The malicious revoked commitment transaction is
settled on-chain at H + 1.
Since the latest block Alice sees corresponds to time H −C , she
wonâĂŹt detect the channel revocation until reaching H + 1. At
that time, the honest network and Mallory are already at height
H + C + 1. The contestation period is expired for the rest of the
honest network, and the malicious spend is fully valid.
4.4 A2: Targeting Per-Hop Packet Delay
This attack is based on exploiting the HTLC-based routing.
The attack starts with two lightning channels being opened:
Mallory-Bob and Bob-Mallet. Bob enforces a cltv_delta (see Section
2.4) ofM blocks on incoming HTLCs. We summarize how different
LN implementations choose the cltv_delta in Table 1. Mallory and
Mallet eclipse BobâĂŹs Bitcoin node and perform time-dilation
until they gain a lead ofM + 1 blocks on Bob.
Once Mallory and Mallet have managed to beM+1 blocks ahead
of Bob, they route a payment through him with a final timelock
delta of N . On Bob-Mallet channel, HTLC timelock expires atH +N .
On Mallory-Bob channnel, HTLC timelock expires at H +M + N ,
therefore satisfying Bob’s cltv_delta ofM . As before,H is the height
of the actual latest block in the network.
Once the actual Bitcoin blockchain tip is at height H +M + N ,
Mallet provides a required preimage to Bob and gets from Bob a
signature for a new state.
At the same time, Mallory finalizes the state of her channel on the
Bitcoin blockchain and broadcasts her HTLC-timeout transaction to
get back the offered payment. This prevents Bob from re-negotiating
the state of that channel via the preimage he just got against a full-
payment to Mallet, making him effectively robbed. We summarize
the attack in Fig. 3.
4.5 A3: Targeting Packet Finalization
This attack is based on exploiting the incoming HTLC safety delay
on a channel. When a party knows the preimage for an incoming
HTLC but the remote peer doesn’t respond in a timely manner
to update channel state, the party will go on-chain to claim the
incoming HTLC a few blocks before expiration.
Mallory, the attacker, starts by time-dilating Bob, the victim, by
I + 1 blocks (as specified in Table 4). The attacker has to wait an
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Figure 4: Attack A3. Mallory is an attacker, Bob is a time-
dilated victim, Alice simply routes a payment via Bob.
extra block to avoid a broadcast race condition between an honest
preimage transaction and a malicious HTLC-timeout.
At H , an HTLC is routed from Alice via Mallory to Bob and
will expire at H + N , with H actual latest block in the network,
and N final timelock delta. There is no collusion between Alice, an
honest payer, and Mallory. Bob reveals the preimage to Mallory,
and Mallory deliberately doesn’t reply back to update channel
state. When the blockchain tip reaches H + N on the non-eclipsed
network, Mallory broadcasts her commitment and HTLC-timeout
transactions, therefore making revealed preimage invalid to claim
offered HTLC on the Mallory-Bob channel.
Finally, when Bob reaches H + N − I on his blockchain view, he
attempts to claim the incoming HTLC by broadcasting his Preimage
transaction. This one is going to be rejected by other network
peers, the HTLC output has already been finalized by Mallory’s
HTLC-timeout transaction. Then, Mallory claims offered HTLC
on Mallory-Alice channel, presenting Bob’s preimage, therefore
earning a routed payment for which she hasn’t sent fund forward.
This attack differs from the previous one because an attacker
only needs one channel with a victim, but also needs to be selected
for a payment path. It also differs in the way an attacker finalizes
the channel on-chain while stealing funds (by timing out a stolen
HTLC). We summarize the attack in Fig. 4.
5 EVALUATION
The practicality of time-dilation attacks once the node is already
eclipsed can be measured by the time it takes to perform them and
the failure rate. The timing aspect is relevant because if the attack
takes several days, it can be more easily disrupted by a random
event (e.g., a scheduled restart making a victim node connect to
new peers).
Both of these metrics depend on the countermeasures software
uses to disrupt time-dilation attacks. We previously mentioned
that there is currently no dedicated countermeasure implemented
for this purpose. In this section we explore how one mechanism,
originally designed for another purpose, bounds the practicality of
time-dilation attacks.
The only heuristic employed by Bitcoin Core implementation
which may help to break free from eclipsing is stale tip detection. If a
block hasnâĂŹt arrived during the last 30 minutes, a node attempts
to establish one extra outbound connection and sync tips with a
new peer, and then repeats it in 10 minutes if a block was not found
during that time. This feature was originally introduced to handle
non-malicious failures of honest nodes to provide the latest blocks.
This countermeasure does not guarantee to mitigate the Eclipse
attack, because a victimâĂŹs chosen extra outbound connections
may be the attackerâĂŹs Sybil node.
We will further refer to the probability of this event as a failure
rate, upon which an attacker can improve. For example, an attacker
can degrade the effectiveness of this extra connection by poisoning
the victim’s address manager while the node is eclipsed. Although it
was demonstrated to be impractical [19, 37], it may become feasible
when a node is eclipsed.
5.1 Optimal Attack Strategy
To reduce the possibility of the victimâĂŹs Bitcoin node de-eclipsing
due to the stale tip detection, the attacks we demonstrate never
intentionally trigger stale tip detection. An attacker should never
exceed 30-minute delay between delivering blocks. It is possible,
however, that stale tip detection may be triggered naturally by
the randomness of the block mining process. According to our
estimates, this happens with a probability of 5% (e−(30/10)), so on
average 7 times a day.
The optimal strategy for an attacker would be to delay every
block by 29.5 minutes. This time value is chosen to never exceed a
30-minute stale tip detection threshold with a room for network
and processing latency.
This approach works best because it allows the fastest time-
dilation without triggering the stale tip check. At the same time, it
reduces the probability of "natural" de-eclipsing as much as possible:
an attacker accumulates the time which can be used to amortize
naturally slow (>30 minutes) blocks in the most efficient way. If an
attacker combines it with address manager poisoning to make sure
de-eclipsing doesn’t help the victim, the delay can be increased.
We created a simulation-based model accounting for the expo-
nential nature of block generation and stale tip detection. In our
model, we simulate a generation of 1,000 blocks, and model an
attack per which attacker delays every block by a constant chosen
interval of 29.5 minutes, so that the stale tip check is never triggered.
We repeat this experiment 100,000 times for every configuration.
5.2 Length and Success Rate of the Attacks
According to our model, the time it takes to become ahead of a
victim by 144 blocks is 36 hours. We summarize the estimated time
of keeping a node eclipsed required to perform time-dilation attacks
based on the configurations of Lightning Network implementations
in Tables 2, 3, 4. These results are based on the configurations
presented in Table 1.
To confirm the results produced by the model, we derived an
intuitive formula. The following formula assumes that every block
comes exactly in 10 minutes, instead of the exponential distribution
observed in practice. This is why the formula does not include any
failures (a block interval can’t exceed 30 minutes). The formula
computes how long an attacker has to keep a victim eclipsed (ET ),
if an attacker needs to be ahead of the victim for a given number
of blocks (TL) to break the timelock, and an attacker is limited to
delay every block only for a given time (SR).
Implementation Eclipse time (N) Eclipse time (BC)
C-lightning 24h 36h
LND 24-336h 36-508h
Eclair 120h 182h
Rust-lightning 24h 36h
Table 2: The time a node has to remain eclipsed to allow
attack A1 with Bitcoin Core and Neutrino backends.
Implementation Eclipse time (N) Eclipse time (BC)
C-lightning 2.3h 4h
LND 6.6h 10h
Eclair 24h 36h
Rust-lightning 12h 18h
Table 3: The time a node has to remain eclipsed to allow
attack A2 with Bitcoin Core and Neutrino backends.
Implementation Eclipse time (N) Eclipse time (BC)
C-lightning 1.2h 1.9h
LND 1.7h 2.7
Eclair 1.9h 2.9h
Rust-lightning 1h 1.6h
Table 4: The time a node has to remain eclipsed to allow
attack A3 with Bitcoin Core and Neutrino backends.
Given a targeted timelock(TL, in blocks) and a per-block mali-
cious slowdown rate (SR, in minutes), an attacker can estimate the
required eclipsing time (ET , in minutes):
ET = (TL + 10
SR
∗TL) ∗ 10 (2)
The formula intuitively reads as follows: TL is the number of
blocks of advantage required to be mined in the network, 10SR repre-
sents how much a victim’s blockchain tip moves per every block of
advantage, while an attacker dilates them by TL blocks. The blocks
in the second term are "undilatable" and have to be mined at a
normal rate because all the dilation went into producing blocks in
the first term. Since both of these values are in blocks, we need to
multiply by 10 to get a result in minutes.
For Neutrino, where SR is unbounded, an attacker has to simply
wait when an honest network minesTL blocks, because the second
term is zero, the victim’s tip just never moves. For SR=0, the result
is infinity, meaning it’s impossible to perform the attack without
any slow down rate.
Let’s say an attacker wants to be ahead of a victim by TL=40
blocks, and they can dilate at SR=0.33h per block (20 minutes). In
this case, they would have to eclipse a victim for ET=3.33h. This
example corresponds to the case of exploiting CLTV timelock of
LND, which the model claims to be possible within 10 hours with a
slowdown rate of 30 minutes, as set by the Bitcoin Core constraints
we previously discussed.
Stale tip check can be triggered naturally even under the most
optimal attack strategy. It would happen when it took very long to
mine a block. In this case, the delayed delivery time of a particular
block will be behind the actual block generation time. According to
our model, with a chosen strategy of delaying for 29.5m every time,
the probability of this natural de-eclipsing (attack failure rate) is
around 7%.
Intuitively, the probability of successful de-eclipsing via the stale
tip check rapidly goes down with every maliciously delayed block.
For a first block to trigger a stale tip detection (while a node is
under attack), the natural mining time of that block should exceed
30 minutes, while for a fourth block it should exceed 80 minutes.
The probability of these events is 5% and 0.03% respectively.
Since Neutrino does not implement stale tip detection, there is
no such upper bound, and the time it takes to dilate a node by a
chosen number of blocks is constrained only by the natural time
to produce those blocks. At the same time, without this check, the
attacks on Neutrino always succeed.
If an attacker had (or chose) to use 19.5m delays instead of 29.5m,
it would increase the attack failure rate from 7% to 22%, while
increasing the time it takes to perform time-dilation from 25-32h for
reaching a difference of 100 blocks. Reducing the stale tip threshold
wouldn’t help against time-dilation, because it would significantly
increase false positives.
5.3 Gain from the Attacks
Even though Eclipse attacks against full nodes are difficult ex-
pensive [37], an attacker may steal all liquidity available at a vic-
tim’s LN node at once. In addition, since latest Eclipse attacks
are infrastructure-level [30, 37], they may target several nodes at
once. Since full nodes are often used by large LN hubs or service
providers and have high available liquidity, an attacker may justify
the high Eclipse attack cost by stealing aggregate liquidity from
several nodes at once. As for the LN users running light clients,
stealing from them is already easy enough, so even stealing rather
low amount may be justified.
The amount per channel to be stolen from a victim is technically
different across attacks, but usually equals the channel capacity.
Lightning Network recently lifted [15] the channel capacity bounds,
allowing users to open as large channels as they want. In practice, a
median LN node capacity is 0.003 BTC, and the total amount locked
in LN channels is 940.5 BTC, as of May 20206.
AttackA1 assumes that an attacker commits one of the outdated
states on-chain. To maximize the gain, an attacker would claim
the state where they had the largest amount. Picking a particular
state does not make an attack more difficult. An attacker can then
steal full channel capacity, minus a small value ("channel reserve"),
enforced by the protocol to disincentivize channel revocations.
It is possible that there was no state per which all funds were
located on the attacker’s side of the channel. In that case, an attacker
can route payments to themselves via the victim, and move funds
to the attacker’s side of the channel.
Attacks A2 and A3 rely on stealing in-flight HTLC, so they can
steal at most the maximum in-flight value, as negotiated during
channel opening. In most of the LN implementations, this value is
by default the same as the full channel capacity.
61ml.com
6 COUNTERMEASURES
We split countermeasures into preventing time-dilation itself, pre-
venting the exploitation of it, and the issues related to reacting once
the exploitation is detected. The ideas we suggest are heuristics:
they can’t guarantee full mitigation of time-dilation attacks, but
rather increase the attack cost.
At the end of this section we discuss WatchTowers separately,
because they can be used as all three types of countermeasures.
6.1 Preventing Time-Dilation
Preventing Eclipse attacks on Bitcoin nodeswouldmake time-dilation
impossible. The cost of Eclipse attacks can be increased via the fol-
lowing measures.
Higher connectivity and the number of honest reachable
nodes. As it was shown in Section 3.2, the probability of Eclipse
attacks goes down when any of the two parameters are increased.
There are three ways to achieve this:
• encourage users to provide more resources (bandwidth, com-
putational) to the network
• make the use of those resources more efficient
• increase adoption and deployment of BIP 157 (especially
server-side) across the ecosystem
Peer diversity. Since both Eclipse attacks and transaction origin
inference involve an attacker connecting to the victim, increasing
the cost of Sybil attacks is an effective countermeasure. If honest
nodes make decisions based on some scarce property, it would make
it more difficult for an attacker to gain enough connections. Com-
plementing anti-Sybil mechanisms (e.g., peer diversification based
on the peerâĂŹs Autonomous System) with proactive topology
improvements through peer rotation would help to break free from
ongoing Eclipse attacks [37].
Link layer diversity.A natural countermeasure to peer-to-peer
layer attacks is communication redundancy: using several inter-
connected multi-homed nodes, a VPN, a mesh network, or the
Lightning Network itself for block and transaction relay. If any of
these methods are employed to receive blocks and transmit transac-
tions, an attacker would be required to disrupt the attacks as well.
in the case of bandwidth-constrained communication channels,
transmitting block headers would be enough to detect an anomaly.
In addition, LN clients may serve each other to increase their
security in a web-of-trust-style deployment. A "friendly" client
may be asked to watch a list of outputs spending belonging to
another client and notify in the case of a match against their filters.
Therefore, an attacker would have to control all chain providers
of every relevant swarm. Given resources and incentives for the
watching client and the privacy leak for the beneficiary client, this
scheme relies on social trust assumption (e.g., a set of mobile wallets
belonging to a family).
Peer-to-peer protocols anonymity is a standalone research
topic. Integrating ideas from prior work [20, 22] into Bitcoin Core,
as well as improving the existing features may make time-dilation
attacks impractical.
Although straightforwarduse of Bitcoin overTorwas demon-
strated to be vulnerable to certain attacks [6], other designs of
transaction relay mechanisms involving various mixnets should be
explored.
6.2 Detecting Time-dilation
Although in Section 5 we demonstrated that the current stale tip
detection technique is limited, a specialized time-dilation detection
could be useful.
The local system clock can be used to detect the absence of new
blocks at an unlike-enough interval, similarly to the stale tip check,
although local clock can be a subject to manipulation or system
errors. Alternatively, time present in the header of a mined block
may be compared to the local time, although this field in block
headers is only moderately enforced by consensus. These methods
can be expanded to consider a series of blocks.
Lightning implementation-level warnings in the case of the
observed anomalies may help a node operator identify that a node
is currently under attack. For example, if a Lightning node receives
channel announcements related to blocks âĂĲfrom too far in the
futureâĂİ, it may issue a warning.
Similarly, abnormal routing failure rate may be used. If a
Lightning node is behind in its Bitcoin blockchain view, but Light-
ning payments between honest nodes are still flowing through it,
this node will have a high routing failure rate. This would hap-
pen because honest nodes on the routing path would reject the
forwarded HTLC for being too close to expired. This observation
can be used to detect time-dilation.
The implementation of these measures is not trivial. All these
solutions have a fundamental trade-off: security against false pos-
itive detection rate. And even if an attack was properly detected,
it is unclear what the victim’s reaction should be. In Section 4.2),
we explored why this is problematic by looking at the currently
implemented stale tip detection.
6.3 Reaction
Even if an LN node detected it is under a time-dilation attack and
it’s not too late, it still cannot easily prevent the loss of funds. The
issues with stopping the attack include:
(1) If there are multiple channels opened, it is unclear which of
them should be closed to prevent the loss
(2) For a given channel, it may be unclear which state was com-
mitted by the attacker. This must be taken into account by
the victim when constructing a justice transaction.
(3) A justice transaction should have a proper fee and be trans-
mitted to the miners via the honest peer-to-peer network,
or it won’t be confirmed.
The challenges (1), (2), (4) are critical in the context of a vic-
timâĂŹs Bitcoin node being eclipsed. Thus, even if the attack was
detected, the only solution is to apply the same anti-eclipsing mech-
anisms we suggested above.
6.4 WatchTowers
This approach implies that chain monitoring is replicated with
different computers, each of them maintaining the channel state
[3, 16, 28, 33]. WatchTowers provide an alternative stack operating
over a separate infrastructure. This raises the bar for an attacker by
making Eclipse attacks and transaction origin inference, and thus
imrpoves on all three suggested countermeasure directions.
The current discussion around WatcTtowers usually assumes
they are operated by special providers, and not users themselves.
This increases the robustness even further but introduces an extra
assumption about the WatchTower provider.
7 DISCUSSION
Other time-sensitive protocols. While the attacks we demon-
strated were specifically targeting Lightning Network, we believe
that a wide variety of Bitcoin second layer protocols [17, 21, 26, 36]
may be susceptible to time-dilation attacks. This applies to any of
them where timelocks are used to arbitrate parties willing to com-
mit concurrent on-chain transactions. We believe that designers
of those protocols should take time-dilation threats into account
whilst arguing about their security.
Combined attack with mempool spam. The attacks we dis-
cussed may be prevented by the victim detecting it and submit-
ting a justice transaction in a timely manner. During an attack, a
victim has to act in a very limited time-frame, less than the one
anticipated in the original timelock. An attacker may make it even
harder for a victim by running a DoS against Bitcoin, to ensure the
victimâĂŹs transaction is not confirmed. If LN implementations
employ dynamic fee-bumping, this may help a victim to prioritize
their transactions and overcome DoS.
Attacker controls broader infrastructure. The attacks we
demonstrated work under limited capabilities of the adversary. If
an adversary controls the victim’s ISP, or has ways to influence
DNS responses, or have other ways to exploit the key infrastructure,
the attacks may be executed at a much lower cost. It also makes
countermeasures we suggested much less efficient.
Better mapping techniques There are more advanced tech-
niques for correlating Bitcoin and Lightning nodes. For example,
an attacker can use timing analysis of bootstrap/restart or force a
Lightning node to close a channel to speed up transaction origin
inference. We leave this research for future work.
Initial Block Download after 24h. Although we mentioned
that there is currently no dedicated mechanism for time-dilation
detection, one relevant feature of Bitcoin Core software is switch-
ing to Initial Block Download mode. This switching can then be
detected by LN operator. It happens if the time defined in the latest
known block header is 24h behind the current system time. This
feature is not efficient against time-dilation attacks, because, as we
demonstrate in this paper, they need to dilate less than 24 hours.
We do not recommend modifying it to be useful in this context,
because it was not originally designed to prevent attacks.
Explore tradeoffbetweenhigher-security and fund liquid-
ity. Increasing the timelocks would require an attacker to keep a
victim eclipsed for longer, and would give a victim more time to
prevent the attack or react to it. This makes more secure channels
less dynamic because in a non-cooperative case it takes longer to
settle them. Attack cost may be spread by exploiting all links of a
single LN node, so the sum of all channel values should be used
to assess operational risks. Reasoning on time-value only is an
incomplete method to argue about sophisticated attacks.
Every LN operator should separately consider their own risks
related to time-dilation, in addition to the time-value trade-off of
payment channels. Finding the proper balance between the systemic
risk caused by the liquidity market for routing payments [8] and
security is an open area of research.
8 RELATEDWORK
Attacks on the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network usually result in eclips-
ing honest nodes and transaction deanonymization.
The first Eclipse attack on Bitcoin was based purely on the high-
level Bitcoin network protocols [19], while the latter exploited BGP
and Internet infrastructure [30, 37]. The studied consequences of
Eclipse attacks include monetary (double-spending attacks, attacks
on mining) and non-monetary (peer-to-peer layer deanonymiza-
tion). The prior art demonstrated that it’s possible to steal funds
via an Eclipse attack via on-chain double-spend, although it would
require access to hashrate and purchasing something from a victim.
Thus, it is more difficult than with time-dilation attacks.
The consequences of Eclipse attacks for the second layer were
only briefly mentioned [19]. Bitcoin was also considered as a tar-
get for attacks on NTP [2, 27], although the consequences for the
second-layer protocols were also not explored.
Attacks on the privacy of the Bitcoin peer-to-peer protocols
demonstrated that transaction deanonymization is fairly feasible
both with simple techniques like first-spy estimator and more ad-
vanced strategies [1, 7, 20, 22, 48].
Some of the privacy improvements were deployed, but they can’t
address the issues in full. Using Tor at the peer-to-peer layer was
demonstrated to be an inadequate solution to these problems [6].
Attacks on the Lightning Network may be split into two groups:
privacy-related or DoS-related. Prior work on privacy mainly ex-
plored real-time balances of channels in the network via probing
[46]. These DoS attacks achieve cheap network congestion prevent-
ing the flow of honest payments [35, 41, 45]. In light of our work,
an attacker may use route hijacking techniques [47] to prepare
targeted channels for time-dilation.
It was also explored how an attacker can steal routing fees [31],
and exploit transaction propagation policies to get an advantage in
LN settlement [12].
To the best of our knowledge, none of the major LN update
proposals [10, 11, 42] can solve the time-dilation issues.
9 CONCLUSIONS
Even though Lightning Network has the potential to address the
scalability limitations of Bitcoin, it introduces new security assump-
tions. In this work we explored how they hold in practice.
More specifically, we explored what can be done when an at-
tacker isolates (eclipses) a user of the Lightning Network, and feeds
blocks to the victim at a slower rate. We showed that time-dilation
cannot be addressed by simply detecting slow block arrival, and
implementing sophisticated detection measures is not trivial.
We argued that time-dilation attacks are currently the most prac-
tical way of stealing funds via Eclipse attacks since time-dilation
attacks do not require access to hashrate and an attacker doesn’t
have to purchase anything from a victim. The Eclipse attack cost
can be justified against both light clients (the cost is low) and full
nodes (an attacker may steal all liquidity of wealthy nodes at once).
Finally, we suggested that strong anti-Eclipse/anti-Sybil mea-
sures (e.g. alternative sources of blocks) is the key to significantly
reducing the risks of time-dilation attacks.
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